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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FDR REVIEW 
1. The decision of the court of appeals affirming the 
decision of the District Court has the effect of establishing 
case law precedent which departs from and establishes: a 
different rule of law than that which has previously been the 
extabl1 shed 1 aw in the State of Utah. 
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs case when 
plaintiff was ready willing and able to proceed. The dismissal 
coming in a pre-trial conference a mere 15 days prior to trial 
date. Evidently District Court became irritated and frustrated 
with counsel for Plaintiff who indicated he wanted to withdraw a 
that point. Reaction of the Court was to dismiss the case for 
failure to prosecute. It would have been just as ea^y to requir 
the case to go forward when all parties were ready willing and 
able to do so. 
2. Early in the chronological history of this case the 
plaintiff moved the district court for summary judgment based on 
pleadings and affidavits. These pleadings and affidavits 
established conclusively that the plaintiff was the owner of the 
property sold by execution to the Rushtons. The Honorable Judge 
Sawaya denied the motion for.a summary judgment and an 
inter 1ocuatory appeal was filed with the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court denied the request for leave to file an 
interlocutory appeal because the decision and the motion was not 
from a final judgment. Plaintiff believes that the ruling denyin 
the Motion for Summary Judgment by Judge Sawaya was in error and 
5 • • 
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should have been granted. 
7hi5 issue of thu request for Summary Judgment and the denial 
of the District Court of that Motion for Summary Judgment was; 
point one on Plaintiffs, Appeal. The Utah; Court of Appeals 
either did not consider the argument or if so, overlooked 
entirely the point in its opinion. This too would establish 
precedent that a point on appeal need not be ruled on. Hud this 
Summary Judgment been the only point on Plaintiff's appeal it 
would have been the subject of the opinion. Because it was only 
one point among three (there could have many more) it was not 
ruled upon, Plaintiff believes it is entitled to a ruling on that 
point. 
REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT OF 
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This petition is based upon the decision of the court of 
appeals of the State of Utah, bearing the caption of this 
petition, Court of Appeals No. 88-0332-CA dated August 23, 1909. 
A copy of the opinion from which the petition is taken is 
attached in the appendix to this petition. 
STATE OF GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
A. The judicial decision of the Court of Apipeal s was 
rendered on August 23, 1989. 
B. This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within 
the period allowed by Rules of Utah Supreme Court, Rule 45 (a) 
also the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under Rule 45(a) and 
6 
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pursuant to 78-2-2 (3)(a) and (5). U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF LAUI 
The provisions of law governing the issues raised in this 
petition are: Rule 41(b) U.R.C.P. (Dismissal of Actions) 
Involuntary Dismissal: Effect thereof. Fur failure of 
the plaintiff to presecute or to comply with these 
rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for 
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. 
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court 
without a jury, has completed the presentation of his 
evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to 
offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, 
may move for a dismissal on the grounds that upon the 
facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to 
relief. The court as trier of the facts may then 
determine then and render Judgment against the 
plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until 
the close of all the evidence. If the court renders 
judgment on the merits against the plaintiff, the* court 
shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless 
the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdictin or for improper venue 
or for lack of an indispenable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
Also the case law is interpreted previously by Utah State 
Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals. 
The second point is found in Article VIII section 3 of th 
Constitution of the State of Utah which states ... 
"Supreme Court shall have appellant jurisdiction over 
all matters to be exercised provided by statue and 
power to issue all writs <=uid orders necessary for the 
exercise of Supreme Courts jurisdiction or the complete 
determination of any cause. 
Section 5 of this Article states... 
"The jurisdiction of other courts original and 
appellent shall be provided by statute." 
7 
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The power of the Supreme Court is set forth in 79~2~2 LLC,A, 
(2) The Supreme Court has appellant jurisdiciton including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals over ..-
"the judgment of the court of appeals...and for (the 
Supreme Court n<jy transfer the Court of Appeals and any 
other matters over which the Supreme Court has 
or i g i nal 1 y app^l1 ant jurisdiction)," 
This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals and the Court 
oT Appeals under 73-2a-3 (B) appeals from District Court. This 
Appeal was filed under Rule 3 in an appeal as of right and was 
assigned to the Curcuit • Court, Rule 3 states 
..."an appeal may be taken from a District Court to the 
Supremo Court from all final orders and judgments 
except as otherwise as provided by law." 
Under Rule 4(a) the case was transferred from the Supreme CL-UV L 
to Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiff believes that the matter was properly before Court 
of Appeals and that a proper issue was raised which was not 
addressed by the Court of Appeals. 
• STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff-Appellant Maxfield held fee simple title to 
two tracts of real property located in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. The State of Utah had obtained a judgment against a 
predecessor in title-to Maxfield. The State with full knowlege 
that the real property did not belong to the judgment Debtor of 
the State, proceeded to execute on the real property of the 
Plaintiff. Rustons, Co-Defendants with the State of Utah 
purchased the property at Sheriffs Sale. Plaintiff-Appellant did 
8 
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absence. The properties had a value of approximately $50,000.00 
ea^h o/ $100,000.00. Defendants Respondents purchaiud for cab out 
*15,000.00. (For both) Rushtons were parents of the Secretary of 
the Attorney in the office of the Assistant Attorney General who 
conducted the sale. 
Originally Plaintiffs felt that this was Just an oversight 
ar.d a comedy of errors and that the whole transaction could be 
reversed. 
Plaintiff filed an action asking to have the sale set aside. 
In connection with this action, Plaintiff-Appellant filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment supported by affidavits. Mo 
competent response was filed. The Honorable Judge James S. 
Saw,*ya denied the motion. Plaintiffs-Appellants filed a petition 
for interlocutory appeal to Utah Supreme Court. This petition 
was den led. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants felt the motion was well taken. 
This Question was raised on appeal. The rational for this 
Writ of Certiorari is that this question was not addressed by the 
Court of Appeals. 
This matter had come before the Honorable Judge David S. 
Young for pre-trial. At the pre-trial hearing (with trial only 
days away and Plaintiff ready willing and able to proceed) Judge 
Young dismissed the case for "failure to presecute". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action concerns the ownership right of possession and 
9 
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ra..:t-s ox r^ai property 
City, Utah, described as follows: 
All of Lot S3 HILLSDALE SUBDIVISION NO. 8 
according to the official plat thereof as 
recorded in the Office of the Salt Lake: 
County Recorder; 
Also know as 3020 West 2935 South West 
Valley City, Utah; • 
and 
The North 20 feet of Lot IS, all of Lot 13 
and the South 15 feet of Lot 20, Block 1, 
WAVERLY SUBDIVISION, according to the 
official plat thereof as recorded in the 
Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder; 
Also known as 616 North Colorado Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(See Amended Complaint: R-5, 6, and 7) 
1. Tor a number of years prior to August 10, 19S0 the 
Plaintiff-Appellant held purchasers equity and fee simple title 
in the properties mentioned above. 
2. On August 10, 1980, the State of Utah Department of 
Social Services received a Preacipe requesting an execution sale. 
CR-34). 
3. The property was sold on October 1, 1990. CR-40) 
4. On August 21, 1980, and Execution on the properties was 
issued by the Salt Lake County Clerk. (R-35) 
5. No notice was ever given the Plaintiff, notwithstanding 
he was owner of record of the properties. (See Max field R-25, 
26, and 27) 
6. No notice was given the judgment debtor. (See Maxfield 
10 
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The properties were not posted as required by ia\ 
and 27; also Statement by Kent Maxfield Affidavit, R-25, 26, 
Smith who stated Sheriff gave him the notice R-33) 
S. Maxfield, on March 11, 1981, through counsel, moved for 
summary judgment to set the sale aside. (See R-13) 
9. Defendants Rushton moved to dismiss Plaintiff 
Max field's complaint (R-8 and 9) 
10. Henry Nygaard (Defendant's counsel) submitted an 
affidavit iii which paragraph 2 and 3 are heresay and in any t:,vent 
irrelevant and incompetent as to any relevant fact. 
11. The Judgment in the Romero Case No. 216937 (R-112) 
makes no reference to fraud and it does not impose a lien on any 
real property and certainty not the real property subject of the 
act i on. 
12. The facts of the Affidavits of Maxfield and Romero were 
were not controverted. Said facts established that a contract 
executed May 21, 1969, was assigned by Mesne Conveyances to 
Beaver Investment, and partnership, to Golden Circle Investment, 
and upon payment of $30,000 and $20,000 the properties were 
convened to Maxfield (Maxfield Affidavit R-25, 26, and 27). None 
of these critical facts were even addressed in the Nygaard 
Af f i davit. 
13. Subsequently in an Affidavit by Steve Schwendiman be 
acknowledged that he knew that Maxfield was record title holder, 
but he gave Maxfield no notice of the sale (R-105). 
11 
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14. A trial was £t-L fur January 1C-11, 1335 (R-215), -
15. Dr. J^iuary 3, 1385, the State of Utah, through counsel, 
asked to have trial continued without date pending termination of 
Maxfield bankruptcy. 
16. Only on the 25th day jf February, 1337, was it made 
possible for trial to proceed by Order of the Bankruptcy Court 
:* p „ ~> q ^  > ^ 
17. Cn June 1, 1037, a scheduling order Wou entered setting 
trial for September 15, 19S7, and the pretrial hearing for August 
IS. Nu Court Reporter was present at the pretrial heaviny 
and there was no record. (See Maxfield Affidavit). 
.19. At a pretrial hearing on August 31, 1937, plaintiff's 
counsel requested leave to withdraw. The Court did not grant 
leave to withdraw but did enter an Order that Plaintiffs causes 
be dismissed for failure to presecute. 
20. The Plaintiff was ready and willing to proceed with 
trial when Judge Young entered an Order of Dismissal (See 
Maxfield Affidavit) Maxfield had paid counsel in excess of 
$14,000 to represent him on the Case atnd at the tri^l. 
POINT I 
THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS DID MOT ADDRESS 
THE ISSUE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT REQUESTED BY 
PLAINT IFF-APPELLANT. 
There appears to be no case law on whether an appellate 
court should address and issue an appeal. 
Plaintiff-Appellant had moved for summary judgment early in 
12 
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chain of title in the Plaintiff-Appellant. The motion was 
de-r, iu>d. Plaintiff filed a petition for leave to file an 
interlocutory appeal which was denied by the Supreme Court on tht 
grounds that it was not "an appeal from d fii.ul disposition". 
When the caie was finally disposed of, the condition "final 
disposition" was satisfied. The issue of that denied summary 
judgment was raised in the appeal. It was not ruled on by the 
court of appeals. The question before this court is whether the 
court of appeals err^d in "not ruling" on count one 
U ^ p ^ U i 
POINT II 
• iUETT 
U i O U 
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•urp 
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C>Q£T 
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HEARING 
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AVI 
CA 
IAL 
D S 
SE ! 
ON! 
. YOUNG ABUSED H 
WITH PPEDJUDICE 
LY 15 DAYS AWAY. 
T Q 
AT 
Thof e were many cases cited by the appellate c^ -urt in its 
ruling on appeal cites a number of cases in which cases ha.o beer. 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. None of the cases cited, 
however go as far as to di'smiss a case at a pre-trial, just 15 
days prior to trial. 
In Brasher Motor & Finance Company vs. Brown 23 Utah 2d 247, 
461 P.2d 4£4 (1369) there had been no activity for 5 1/2 years. 
In Charles Brown Construction Company vs. Leisure Sports, Inc. 
740 p. 2D. 1368 (Utah Court of Appeals 1337) neither party 
appeared at pre-trial after a history of inactivity. 
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i>l i a •I -.a '-r t '.-' l i d i L i i t^ •/ ^5 r-« _ • _ _ ere 
di£ii;i5sed after 19 years, 7 years since last activity. 
I i:UiTip3L':! i.-' x i- L. H v => • • J c*'- K S ^ H A. J U & • X. G U U 3 , vJO O » . 
(1373) was dismissed on motion after plaintiff moved for pre— 
t r ial setting. 
The appellate court cited but did not follow the ruling i. M 
West inqhouse Electric Supply Company vs. Paul U!. Larsen, contract 
544 P.2d S76 CUt 1375) m which the court stated... 
"A court ? i discretionj however, must be balanced 
against a higher priority; to "afford disputants an 
opportunity to be heard and to do justice between 
them." Westinqhouse Elec. Supply Co., 544 P. 2d at S73. 
Thus, there is more to consider in det er'ming i ng if a 
dismissal for failure to prosecute is proper than 
merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit was 
filed. Id. The factors which we consider tuay include 
the following: (1) The conduct of both parties; (2) 
the opportunity each party has had to move the case 
forward; (3) what each of the parties has done to move 
the case forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice may 
have been caused to the other side; and (5) most 
important, whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. K.L.C. Inc. v. Mclean, 656 P.2d 336, 388 
(Utah 1382); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris, 5G5 P.2d 1135, 
1127 ( Utah 1377) 
"!"he appellate court, however, did not follow its 
observations above, but sustained the district court in its order 
of dismissal. 
The decision appears to honor procedural rules above, 
substantive policy and objective as set forth in Rule 1 U.C.R.P. 
..."they shall be liberally construed to. secure the 
just speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
JItion. 
14 
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aHpeIIale court certainly does not reach a "just determination" 
a?id in any event extends the limits of power of a trial .^ ..J^ e to 
dismiss a case on the threshold of a trial. Further the decision 
of the court has the effect of confirming a manifest of injustice 
which allows the state (who should protect rights) to execute on 
property not of the judgment debtor. This expands to rule of law 
significantly and is an appropriate subject for review by the 
Dei ted th i.<y of September, 1339. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^ V ^ 7 ^ irC^ 
Lorin N. Pace 
Attorney for the Appellant 
MAXAPPSC.919 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Reed Maxfield/ 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Owen A. Rushton and Carol 
Rushton, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Owen A. Rushton and Carol 
Rushton, his wife, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
State of Utah, by and through 
Utah State Department of 
Social Services, 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Co-Respondents. 
F I L E D 
+^ I M«ry T. Noorwn 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880332-CA 
Cltrk of *»• Court 
U*h Court »f Appeals 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Lorin N. Pace, Salt Lake City, for Appellants. 
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for Respondents; 
David L. Wilkinson, Stephen G. Schwendiman, Bernard 
M. Tanner, Leonard E. McGee, Salt Lake City, for 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff and appellant, Reed Maxfield, appeals the trial 
court's dismissal of his action against defendants and 
respondents, Owen A. and Carol Rushton, and the State of Utah, 
for failure to prosecute. We affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of his action. 
We recite only those facts pertinent to disposition of this 
appeal. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Maxfield initially filed his complaint in this action on 
October 20, 1980, alleging that the Rushtons had wrongfully 
deprived him of his property by purchasing it through an 
illegal sheriff's sale. The Rushtons filed their answer and 
counterclaim on April 1, 1981, along with a third-party 
complaint against the State of Utah, requesting reimbursement 
of the purchase price for the property if the court should find 
in Maxfield's favor. On April 14, 1981, the State answered the 
Rushtons' third-party complaint and filed a third-party 
complaint against Maxfield. 
From October 20, 1980 until December 14, 1984, various 
motions were filed by the parties, primarily by Maxfield, 
resulting in obfuscation of the issues and protracted delay. 
Two additional factors contributed to the delay: an eighteen 
month interruption while the Rushtons were on a mission for 
their church, and a bankruptcy filing by Maxfield. 
The case remained in limbo for nearly two years as a result 
of Maxfield's bankruptcy. Finally, on November 18, 1986, the 
Rushtons filed a certificate of readiness for trial. Ten days 
later, Maxfield objected to setting the case for trial because 
he wished to amend his complaint by adding further claims 
against the State, his discovery was incomplete, his bankruptcy 
stay was presently effective, and his new attorney needed time 
to familiarize himself with the case. Despite Maxfield's 
objections, on February 20, 1987, the bankruptcy court ordered 
that the case could be heard in district court. Thereupon, the 
State filed for an immediate trial setting. 
On March 4, 1987, Maxfield's counsel withdrew because 
Maxfield had failed to pay him. On March 20, 1987, the 
Rushtons gave Maxfield notice to obtain substitute counsel and, 
again, moved for an immediate trial setting. A hearing was 
scheduled on this motion for June 1, 1987. On May 18, 1987, 
Maxfield filed a pro se objection to the trial setting on the 
grounds that he was incapable of handling the case himself and 
that he was in the process of seeking new counsel. 
At the June 1 hearing, the court set trial for September 
15, 1987, and scheduled a pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987. 
All discovery was to be completed prior to August 17, 1987. 
On August 10, 1987, the State certified to the court that 
it had complied with Maxfield's discovery requests, answered 
Maxfield's proposed second amended complaint, and moved for 
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summary judgment against Maxfield. Maxfield filed a motion to 
dismiss all claims by other parties against him because of his 
discharge in bankruptcy and filed an objection to the trial 
setting, requesting a two month continuance on the grounds that 
his new counsel had scheduling problems and that he intended to 
file a third amended complaint. The court scheduled a hearing 
on the State's motion for summary judgment for August 24, 1987. 
Between August 11 and 17, 1987, the parties filed more 
miscellaneous motions. On August 17, 1987, the court denied 
Maxfield's motion to continue the trial date or to extend 
discovery time. Thereafter, Maxfield filed a response to the 
State's motion for summary judgment, alleging insufficient 
discovery time, and filed his third amended complaint, which 
set forth a new conspiracy theory between the Rushtons and the 
State. 
On August 20, 1987, the State submitted a list of expected 
witnesses and a certificate of compliance with Maxfield's 
discovery requests. The following day, it objected to 
Maxfield's third amended complaint. The Rushtons filed a 
similar objection. The trial court heard all the parties' 
motions on August 24, 1987, denying Maxfield's motion to file a 
third amended complaint and also the State's motion for summary 
judgment. 
At the pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987, the trial court 
again denied the parties' prior motions. Maxfield's new 
attorney moved to withdraw as counsel. The court denied 
counsel's motion to withdraw, and ordered that Maxfield's 
action be dismissed for failure to timely prosecute. Maxfield 
subsequently appealed this order. 
On appeal, Maxfield argues that the trial court erred in: 
(1) dismissing his action for failure to prosecute; (2) 
refusing to grant summary judgment in his favor; and (3) 
refusing either to void the sheriff's sale, thereby quieting 
title in his favor, or to grant him the immediate right to 
redeem the properties. 
The trial court dismissed Maxfield's cause of action, 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
for his "failure to timely prosecute the case."1 Such a 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), in part, states that "[f]or failure 
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or 
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an 
action or of any claim against him." 
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dismissal, under Rule 41(b), "operates as an adjudication upon 
the merits" of the case. 
It is well established that the trial court may, on its own 
motion, dismiss an action for want of prosecution under Rule 
41(b). Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 
P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure 
Sports Inc., 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This 
authority is an H•inherent power,1 governed not by rule or 
statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to 
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases.- Charlie Brown Constr. Co., 
740 P.2d at 1370 (quoting Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 
630-31 (1962)). Therefore, the trial court has Ma reasonable 
latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute 
if a party fails to move forward according to the rules and the 
directions of the court, without justifiable excuse." 
Westinohouse Elec. Supply CO. V. Paul W. Larsen Contractor 
Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975) (footnote omitted). 
Consequently, a lower court's dismissal of a case under Rule 
41(b) will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear from 
the record that it has abused its discretion. Wilson v. 
Lambert, 613 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980); Department of Social 
Servs. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980); Reliance 
Nat, Life Ins. Co. v. Caine, 555 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1976); 
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528, 
529 (1973). 
A court's discretion, however, must be balanced against a 
higher priority: to "afford disputants an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice between them." Westinghouse Elec. 
Supply Co., 544 P.2d at 879. Thus, there is more to consider 
in determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is 
proper than merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit 
was filed. Id. The factors which we consider may include the 
following: (1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the 
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3) 
what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4). 
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other 
side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from 
the dismissal. K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean. 656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 
1982); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 
1977). 
After a thorough review of the record, we find that 
Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the case. After he filed 
his complaint on October 20, 1980, he amended it twice and 
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attempted to amend it yet a third time, each time adding 
additional theories of the case. He moved three times for 
summary judgment: the first time on March 11, 1981, prior to 
joinder of the State; the second time on May 30, 1984; and the 
third time on June 19, 1984, when he neglected to give adequate 
notice of the hearing to opposing counsel. He filed an 
interlocutory appeal in 1981, appealing the trial court's 
refusal to grant his first motion for summary judgment, which 
the supreme court declined to hear. He then filed a number of 
miscellaneous, primarily self-serving motions over the course 
of the proceedings, none of which served to move the case 
forward, but were, instead, apparent attempts to circumvent the 
denial of his motions for summary judgment. He further delayed 
prosecution of the case for nearly two years by filing for 
bankruptcy on December 10, 1984, shortly before the case was to 
come to trial. During this bankruptcy action, he assigned his 
interest in the disputed property, which was his major asset, 
to a corporation which he allegedly owned and controlled as the 
primary shareholder. Further, on the three occasions trial 
dates were set, he objected to the trial settings on the 
grounds that he wished to amend his complaint, that he was 
involved in the bankruptcy proceeding, and that his new counsel 
had inadequate preparation time. During the course of the 
action, he retained three different attorneys, two of whom 
withdrew from the case because of his failure to pay them. He 
filed no certificates of readiness for trial and, despite his 
protests as to insufficient discovery time, no motions for the 
taking of depositions. 
Although the Rushtons did not answer Maxfield's complaint 
for approximately six and one-half months after it was 
initially filed, the rest of their conduct and that of the 
State generally served to move the case along. Together, the 
Rushtons and the State filed four motions indicating their 
readiness for trial, one of which was filed almost immediately 
after the Rushtons returned from their mission. The record 
indicates that they actively pursued discovery, including the 
taking of depositions, and certified twice that they had 
complied with Maxfield's discovery requests. In contrast, they 
had to file motions twice to compel Maxfield to comply with 
their discovery requests. 
In evaluating the relevant factors, we find, first, that 
Maxfield's conduct in prosecuting the case was dilatory while 
defendants' overall conduct served to move the case along. 
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Second, although both parties were unable at times to move 
the case forward, Maxfield's behavior was more dilatory. 
Maxfield was unable to prosecute the case while the Rushtons 
served their eighteen month mission. However, once the 
Rushtons returned, they almost immediately notified the court 
that they were ready to proceed to trial. Similarly, 
defendants were unable to prosecute the case during the 
pendency of Maxfield's twenty-two month bankruptcy action. 
Unlike the Rushtons, however, Maxfield did not voluntarily 
inform the court that his bankruptcy action was completed and 
the case could move forward in district court, but, instead, 
objected to trial settings and waited for the State to petition 
the bankruptcy court for permission to proceed with the action. 
Third, despite his prodigious number of motions, little or 
nothing that Maxfield did after filing his initial complaint 
served to move the case along, while virtually everything that 
defendants did after the Rushtons returned home from their 
mission did. 
Fourth, defendants argue that, if we overrule the trial 
court and remand this case for hearing on the merits, they will 
be substantially prejudiced because many of their witnesses 
have either forgotten the events surrounding the controversy or 
have become unavailable in the nine years this' case has been 
pending. To rebut Maxfield's assertion that he will be 
prejudiced by loss of his property interest without having had 
his day in court, defendants point out that Maxfieldfs property 
interest is already assigned to a corporation in which he 
claims to have no interest. We do not find these assertions to 
be unreasonable. 
Fifth, while we recognize that injustice could result from 
dismissal of this case, in that Maxfield will lose whatever 
interest he may have in the disputed property without having 
the opportunity to argue his case on its merits, we conclude 
that he had more than ample opportunity to prove his asserted 
interest and simply failed to do so. Such nonaction is 
inexcusable, not only from the standpoint of the parties, but 
also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process. 
In Maxfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (Utah 1975), 
the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court justifiably 
dismissed the plaintiff's case because she had been dilatory in 
responding to the defendant's efforts at discovery, had 
resisted attempts made by the defendant to get the case to 
trial, was not ready to proceed at the time of the trial date 
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because of inexcusable neglect/ and had no justification for 
continuance as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b).2 We find 
that the present case is factually comparable to Maxfield v. 
Fishier and other cases which have been dismissed for failure 
to prosecute. See e.g., Thompson Ditch Co., 508 P.2d at 528. 
We# therefore/ affirm the trial court's judgment in dismissing 
Maxfield's action. 
this issue 12 
axfield's r* 
spositive of the case# we decline 
ing issues. Costs on appeal to 
Regnal W. Garff/ Judg 
I CONCTJ 
j^<^*1%CSt^ / ^ g ^ ^ ^ t ^ ^ 
Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge 
Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b) provides that/ 
[u]pon motion of a party, the court may in 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may 
be just/ including the payment of costs 
occasioned by such postponement/ postpone 
a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the 
ground of the absence of evidence/ such 
motion shall also set forth the 
materiality of the evidence expected to be 
obtained and shall show that due diligence 
has been used to procure it. The court 
may also require the party seeking the 
continuance to state# upon affidavit or 
under oath the evidence he expects to 
obtain/ and if the adverse party thereupon 
admits that such evidence would be given, 
and that it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial/ or offered and 
excluded as improper/ the trial shall not 
be postponed upon that ground. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ORME, Judge (concurring specially): 
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute is usually 
not appropriate except when it follows a substantial period of 
complete inactivity. It would be an extraordinary case where 
such a dismissal would be appropriate with trial scheduled in 
just a few days, especially following a flurry of motion 
activity. While the question is a closer one for me than the 
main opinion may suggest/ I am persuaded this is that 
extraordinary case. 
In my view, what saves the dismissal in this case from 
crossing into the realm of abused discretion is this: 
Maxfield's latest counsel's motion for leave to withdraw 
coupled with his motion for leave to file yet another amended 
complaint constituted/ taken together, a concession by Maxfield 
that he was nowhere near being ready to try his case in a 
matter of a few days even though the action had been pending 
for the better part of a decade. It is the length of time this 
action had been pending coupled with Maxfield's obvious 
unreadiness that make sua sponte dismissal appropriate in this 
case. I reiterate, however, that in the ordinary case where a 
trial date is set, potentially dispositive motions have been 
denied at a recent pretrial/ and all parties are represented by 
counsel, however reluctant such representation might be, the 
appropriate course for the court is simply to try the case, 
even though earlier periods of inaction may exist. 
I also wish to comment on two aspects of the main 
opinion's analysis of the parties' comparative culpability in 
connection with the delays which plagued this case. First, the 
opinion says that "Maxfield was unable to prosecute the case 
while the Rushtons served their eighteen month mission" and 
seems to imply that the Rushtons were likewise relieved of 
their duty to.move the case along during that period. However, 
voluntary absence from the jurisdiction does not insulate a 
party from litigation nor is it a legitimate justification for 
avoiding one's own litigation obligations. This is so even 
where the reasons for the absence are well-intentioned/ such as 
with the Rushtons' religious mission in this case. 
Second/ the main opinion seems to blame Maxfield for a 
delay of nearly two years following his bankruptcy filing and 
to suggest that Rushtons were excused from pursuing their 
counterclaims during that time. But from all that appears, 
Maxfield's bankruptcy petition was legitimate under federal law 
and I do not see how we can fault him for taking advantage of 
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his rights under this federal scheme. That being the case, 11 
U.S.C. § 362 stayed the Rushtons and the state from pursuing 
their claims against him. Of course/ this "automatic stay" 
protects the debtor from the prosecution of actions against 
him, but does not, of itself, excuse him from proceeding with 
his actions pending against others. Nonetheless, the debtor's 
claims pending against others become the property of the 
bankruptcy estate and where the bankruptcy is one where a 
trustee is appointed, the trustee succeeds the debtor as real 
party in interest relative to those claims. The trustee enjoys 
the authority to administer the claims, i.e., pursue them, 
settle them, or abandon them as the trustee may deem 
appropriate. Thus, Maxfield may not be responsible for the 
inactivity in the instant action which followed his bankruptcy 
filing. Even if he is, the delay may be entirely legitimate 
depending on the objectives and status of the bankruptcy cases 
and the ongoing progress of liquidation or reorganization. 
Conversely, one who has an action pending against a party 
who files a bankruptcy petition—as with the Rushtons and their 
counterclaim against Maxfield—is not altogether helpless in 
the face of the bankruptcy filing. With leave of the 
bankruptcy court, as ultimately was obtained here, the claim 
can be pursued in state court at least to the point of 
liquidating the claim or, with consent of the non-bankruptcy 
party, can be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. Depending 
on the particular case, waiting two years to request relief 
from the stay may or may not be consistent with appropriate 
diligence on the part of Rushton and the state. 
In short, lengthy delays in state court litigation, for 
which "bankruptcy" is offered up as the major excuse, should be 
carefully scrutinized. Bankruptcy is simply not the hinderance 
to the timely resolution of disputes pending in state court 
which many would have state court judges believe. 
The parties to the main action in this case sparred and 
postured for some seven years, showing little inclination to 
get their claims resolved on the merits. The system had been 
burdened long enough. Dismissal for failure to timely 
prosecute was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. 
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